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Summary findings
Efforts to reform utilities can affect poor households in  Lobo, and Leipziger offer many suggestions about how
varied, often complex, ways, but it is by no means certain  social, regulatory, and privatization policy can increase
that such reform will hurt vulnerable households. Many  the benefits of utility reform for poor  households.
myths have been perpetuated in discussions of utility  The good news is that many measures can be taken to
reform-and  in many cases poor households have  improve the chances that poor households will benefit
benefited from reform.  from reform. Chief among these is promoting
What is amazing is the extent to which governments  competition, where possible.
and their advisors-sometimes  including multilateral  Essentially what is needed is political commitment to
organizations-fail  to measure, anticipate, and monitor  doing the right thing. If policy is weak before
how the privatization of utilities actually a'fects the poor.  privatization, it is going to be weak after privatization as
Many questions must still be answered before good  well. Privatization is no substitute for responsible policy
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The number of  countries in  Latin America that have pursued, or  are pursuing utility sector
liberalization  policies  and are trying  to rely on increased  private  sector  participation  in the sector  grew
dramatically  in the last decade.  These reforms  have generated  total (private plus linked government)
investments  of US$236.5 billion between 1990 and 1998 in Latin America, almost half of all the
investment  in developing  countries.  While this is significant,  it initially tended to be concentrated  in
the largest southern  cone economies,  Bolivia,  Chile and Mexico-although Central America  and the
Caribbean  are now having  their own privatization  phase.  Moreover,  while it represents  only a fraction
of the infrastructure  needs in  Latin America, it detracts from the overriding need to  increase
productive  public  investment  levels  as part of a renewed  growth  strategy  in the Region.'
Of equal importance  is the fact that the increased role of the private sector in infrastructure  is
producing  secondary  distributional  effects that have been too often underestimated  or ignored by
policy makers pressed by the concern to attract private capital to address fiscal problems. The
emergence  of the distributional  issue often stems from the fact that many of the improvements  in
potential  access are combined  with changes  in pricing and financing  rules under which the private
providers  operate. 2 Even when costs go down as a result of greater  productive efficiency,  improved
technology  or more effective uses of scale economies,  direct subsidies or cross subsidies tend to
disappear,  either as an explicit government  decision  for resource  allocation reasons or as a natural
consequence  of market forces  acting in a liberalized  market.
While  average  nominal  tariffs  have declined  with privatization  in many  instances,  the need  to raise  the
effective tariffs or fares for some user groups follows from the need to guarantee the financial
viability of service providers and their incentive to expand service coverage where it is the most
needed. In the process, however, it may increase  the financial burden imposed on some groups of
vulnerable households. This is  a  reasonable concern to  the extent that the significant private
investment  figure quoted earlier is equivalent  to USctsl5/day/inhabitant  which the investors will
somehow  want to recover. 3 Balance  that against the fact that according  to a household  survey of 12
large countries  accounting  for 71% of the population  of the region, 1/3 of the population  lives on less
than US$2/day,  a standard  definition  of poverty. 4 This simple arithmetic  exercise clearly illustrates
the potential  conflict  and social  problems  that can arise  as a result  of the legitimate  needs of operators
to recover  their investments  and the poor who naturally  feel privatization should improve  services  at
an affordable  price.
The paper provides  a tour d'horizon of the "privatization"  experience  in Latin America,  focusing  on
some outstanding  issues surrounding  its impact on the poor, and delves into the reasons why its
benefits  may be undervalued  by some, especially  the poor. The idea is to take stock but also to help
policymakers  improve  the integration  of social dimensions  in the reform  of their infrastructure  sector
and the education  of the voters on the extent to which this integration  is taking  place. The perception
that privatization  policies hurt the poor is widespread  in the popular  press and is an important  factor
determining  the political sensitivity  of the reform agenda. This is why it is important  to consider
documenting  the real impact on the poor of sectoral policies in the infrastructure  sector and to
See Leipziger  (2000)  or Canning,  D. M. Fay and R. Perotti  (1992)  for instance.
2  While in most sectors  (with the exception  of power  generation)  service concessions  tends to be the norm and there is
seldom  a transfer  of ownership  of assets to the private  operators,  policymakers,  academic  and casual  observers  continue  to
talk about privatization. This broad concept of privatization is the one retained throughout the paper.
3  This back of the envelope result is obtained by dividing the average daily investment made between 1990 and 1998 and
dividing it by the 1998 population.
4  Wodon (2000), including a detailed survey of recent studies on the topic.2  Utility Privatization  and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enough to Get It right?
examine  how  countries  may have failed or succeeded.  The ultimate good is to provide  suggestions  as
to how to proceed to integrate  the interest  of the poor into these reforms. One of the main points we
want to argue  here is that, in view of the weakness  of the general welfare  systems in most reforming
countries,  there is a need to integrate  the social  dimension  in utility reform  processes  and to recognize
the relevance  of the design and process  followed  for its effectiveness.
The paper is intended to be both naYve-to ensure no simple question is left out-and  cynical-to
make ensure no tough question is ignored. It is grounded on a combination of macro and micro
concerns  reflecting  the diversity  of political  agents  involved  in the debate-from the finance ministry
and the social ministries  to  the infrastructure  ministries. The paper will try to  document the
circumstances  under which we will have greater,  or lesser, confidence  that the poor will gain and on
this basis to derive a set of principles or guidelines to help shape a more pro-poor privatization
strategy.
We address  the following  specific  questions:
*  How and when can the poor lose from infrastructure  privatization?
*  How to mainstream  the measurement  of the expected  effects of reforms  in the context  of utilities
privatization?
- Is there a case for a special short to medium run "infrastructure  specific welfare policy" while a
country  gets its act together  in putting  together  a more encompassing  welfare  policy?
- How can this overview  help in drawing guidelines  for a policy advisor to minimize  the risks of
losses by the poor from the privatization  of utilities given that not all countries face similar
circumstances?
Since there is no systematic  collection  of information  which would allow a rigorous cross country
comparison,  the analysis  is based on a review  of detailed  analysis  of country  specific  experiences.  The
review  of this partial information  reveals  the existence  of many  misperceptions  of the effects  of utility
,privatization  and the poor and provides initial answers to these key policy questions. Possible  more
importantly,  the review  shows that there is a lot more to learn to ensure that the poverty-privatization
nexus is well understood and that this policy issue is addressed as effectively as its importance
demands.
2.  HOW AND WHEN  CAN THE POOR  LOSE FROM  INFRASTRUCTURE
"PRIVATIZATION"?
There is a widespread  impression  that infrastructure  privatization  has hurt the poor in Latin America--
even if as seen in Box 1, this is clearly not always the case. There are many examples where
governments  have been able to benefit the poor from increased  private sector  participation.
Three stylized  facts lead us to question  a naYve  acceptance  of the proposition  that equates  privatization
with harm for the more vulnerable  in society.  Infrastructure  privatizations  are generally  part of a wider
set of reforms and the status of the poor reflects the interactions  of multiple factors (stylized  fact 1).
While it can be politically  convenient  to highlight privatization  as one of the factors-and  there is
some evidence  of this, as discussed  below-it  is generally  incorrect  to focus all blame on that part of
the agenda.  A series of studies of Argentina-a  country  that undertook  an encompassing  privatization
process-points to the limits of such blanket statements.  Relying  on a general  equilibrium  framework
which models  the main interactions  across markets  resulting from reforms, Chisari et. al. (1999)  andInfrastructure  for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor  3
Navajas (2000) show that, if anything,  infrastructure  privatization  hurt relatively more the middle
class through a redirection  or suppression  of existing  subsidies  (stylized fact 2) and may have even
benefited  the truly poor by increasing  access  to services  (stylized  fact 3).
An accurate  "before and after" comparison  is essential  because  in most Latin American  countries-
and Argentina  is only one example among many-prior  to reform, tariff structures and subsidies
tended to benefit the politically  powerful urban middle classes, rather than the poor. This second
stylized fact is well illustrated  by Colombia.  A careful study of its public subsidies  in 1992 showed
that 38%  of all public sector  subsidies  (including  health,  education,  housing  and other public services)
were, in fact, spent on utility services  representing  1.4% of GNP. Of these 80% were spent in the
electricity sector where the  study found that these subsidies benefited mostly middle income
households.  Subsidies  in the water sector were more  focused on poor households  but were still not
spectacularly  progressive. 5 More recent evidence shows that the distributional impacts of these
subsidies  have not improved  much  since 1992.  This observation  is also documented  by Benitez  et al.
(2000) for Argentina for all utilities.  For Panama, an analysis of existing water subsidies in
preparation  for privatization  showed  that almost  two thirds  of client  households  received  some kind of
subsidy while only 16% of the public company's customers  were either poor or extremely poor
(Foster,  et al. (2000)).  Therefore,  current  subsidy  schemes  mostly  benefited  the urban middle  classes.
A similar situation is recently documented  by Wodon (2000) in his study of electricity  subsidies
provided  by public enterprises  in Honduras.  The subsidy  is in principle  self-targeted,  but in practice  it
is given  to all households  who  have a level of consumption  below 300  kwh per month.  This represents
85 percent of the residential  clients of the national  electricity  company,  a ceiling  clearly too high for
the self-selection  to be restricted  to the poor. Overall,  80 percent  of the subsidy  is spent on households
who consume  more  than 100  kwh.  The main effect  of this type of subsidy  is that except for the lowest
level of consumption  in urban areas,  it to increase  rather  than decrease  inequality.  The suppression  or
the redesign  of this subsidy  can only  help the poor.
The third stylized  fact is that privatization,  if designed  properly,  provides an opportunity  to end the
exclusion  of the poor,  perpetuated  by many cash strapped  public utilities. Indeed, in many Latin
American  countries, the very poor did not have access to utility services before privatization  and
generally  did not benefit from service  expansions.  Privatization,  however,  has the potential  to change
this. Box 1 provides  evidence  from Chile of this last point.
5  See Velez (1996).4  Utility Privatization and the Needs of the Poor in Latin  America: Have We Learned Enough to Get It right?
Box 1: When privatization benefits the poor: Electricity and telecoms in Chile
The table below shows the percentage  of households  in Santiago  who did not have an electricity
connection  or a telephone  in 1988 when privatization  was underway and 1998.  The percentage  of
connected  households  increased  rapidly  after privatization  even  for low income  groups,  especially  in
telecommunications.  However, one cannot attribute all the change to privatization.  There was a
significant  increase  in disposable  incomes  between  both years, as well as price changes.  In addition,
it is difficult  to set a counterfactual  regarding  the investment  rate in connections  that would have
occurred  had these companies  remained  in public hands.  However, there are two pieces of evidence
that would suggest that a large portion of new connections  should be attributed to the increased
investment  capacity  resulting  from private sector  participation,  at least in telecommunications.  First,
before the telecommunications  industry was privatized,  there was a notorious  rationing of lines, as
the companies could not finance the required investment in  switching capacity. Serra (2000)
mentions that the waiting lists for a new line installation  were 40% of the total number of lines
installed,  and that it could take more than 10 years before a phone line was installed.  A secondary
market for telephone  lines developed  with prices of over a thousand  dollars per line, depending  on
the neighborhood.  Therefore, although the economic  boom of the 1990's would probably have
allowed  public companies  to invest more than the previous decade, it is questionable  whether  they
would  have been able to expand  the service  at the same rate as the private sector. Second,  Contreras
and G6mez-Lobo  (2000), using probit regression techniques  have tried to separate the effects of
disposable  income growth on connection  rates from other influences.  Their research suggests  that a
large fraction of new connections can be attributed to factors other than growth of household
income. Although other influences may be  at work, the presumption is  that the increase in
connections  was a supply  driven  phenomenon  rather  than demand  induced.
Table B1: Percentage  of households  with access to electricity and telecoms services in Greater
Santiago,  Chile, 1988-98
Income  per capita  Households  without  electricity  Households  without  telephone
decile
i  -___________  1988  l  ;1998  1988  1  998.
1  29.4%  7.0%  98.8%  68.9%
2  19.9%  4.0%  96.2%  53.2%
3  12.0%  2.7%  91.3%  43.6%
4  11.3%  3.1%  87.4%  35.3%
5  7.7%  2.4%  84.5%  24.6%
6  5.9%  2.3%  72.8%  22.2%
7  5.1%  1.3%  63.9%  14.9%
8  2.8%  2.5%  45.5%  9.8%
9  1.6%  1.1%  29.5%  6.8%
10  0.9%  0.7%  12.0%  4.4%
Source: Family Expenditure Surveys, 1988 and 1998.
The issue of connection  to services  by poor households  is crucial to gauge the potential effects of
privatization  and in order to improve the benefits of reform that accrue to these households.  For
instance,  Ajwad and Wodon (2000)  show that in  Bolivia, the poor may not benefit as much as the
non-poor  from a network  expansion  even when  these are managed  by public enterprises.  They provide
estimates  of marginal  benefit incidence  of increased  access to infrastructure  in Bolivia in 1996-see
Table 1-for  municipalities  classified into three income groups. They show that in infrastructure,Infrastructure  for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor  5
access to water is the only service for which the poor benefit as much as the non poor from an
expansion  of the service. In all other cases (sewage,  electricity,  garbage collection,  and telephone),
the non-poor  benefit more than the poor from a service  expansion.  While these differences  need not
persist  over time (specifically,  once the non-poor  have near  universal  access, the poor may benefit  the
most from any additional  provision),  they highlight  the need  to implement  special  policies at an early
stage for the provision of infrastructure  services if the poor are to benefit. The upshot is that if
governments  fail to correct this exclusion  of the poor through specific policies, the poor will be as
excluded  post-privatization  as they  were before.
Table 1: Who benefits  from an infrastructure  service  expansion  in Bolivia?
albnfiticdne1  uii  income groupl
________________Estimates  Of  th'e magnlbenefit  incidence by  m  aic,
Poor  Middle  Rich
INFRASTRUCTURE
Water  0.937  1.124  0.940
Sewage  0.219  0.881  1.900
Electricity  0.504  1.355  1.141
Garbage  collection  0.534  0.687  1.779
Telephone  0.305  0.654  2.041
Source: Ajwad and Wodon (2000) based on 1996 municipal level data. An estimate of marginal
benefit incidence larger (smaller) than one indicates that the corresponding group benefits more
(less) than other groups from a national expansion of the service.
A more systematic  analysis  and summary  of the available  evidence  widens the perspective  provided
by these stylized facts by focusing  on some more detailed  aspects  of the reforms and show how the
poor will often lose in unintended  ways if policy makers  do not anticipate  some of the outcomes  of
reform.  To help in this direction,  we classify  the potential  effects  of privatization  or liberalization  into
microeconomic  and macroeconomic  linkages  (see Foster  (1999)  for the original idea).
2.1.  The  microeconomic  linkages
2.1.1.  Losing  from  joining the formal  economy  and paying  a higher  effective  tariff?
Starting with microeconomic  linkages,  it may be worth highlighting  that privatization  can affect the
actual costs faced  by poor households  through  several  channels,  as summarized  in Table 2. First, any
type of  private participation (even a  leasing contract) is  likely to  substantially increase the
effectiveness  of revenue collection. If poorer households  were not billed prior to the reform or
informal  connections  to the service  were tolerated,  the actual  payments  of these households  is likely
to increase  after the reform.  This will occur even if nominal  tariffs do not change  (or even decrease),
since  these  households  would have  to actually  pay for the service  whereas  before they paid  nothing.
The evidence suggests that illegal or informal connections are much more common among poor
households and therefore the implicit subsidy from non-payment  is bound to be progressive.  For
example,  V6lez (1996) estimates  that the implicit  subsidy from non-payment  by informal or illegal
connection  in the main urban centers of Colombia  in 1992 accounted  for 6% of all subsidies  in the
electricity  sector and 24% of all subsidies  in water  and sanitation.  In the gas sector, whereas  formally
connected households paid a surcharge over costs, non paying households received an implicit
subsidy. Overall, close to 9% of all subsidies in the gas, electricity and water sector in Colombia
distributed in 1992 were accounted for by illegal connections or non-payment. Furthermore,  the6  Utility Privatization and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enough to Get It right?
distribution of this  subsidy  was highly progressive with more  than  72% and  73% of the subsidy
benefiting households in the five poorest deciles of the income distribution in the electricity and water
sector, respectively (with close to 20% of the subsidy in each sector benefiting households in the first
decile). The elimination of this implicit subsidy could have a negative effect on poor households if it
is not compensated by other measures.
Table 2: Summary of microeconomic linkages between increased
private sector participation in infrastructure and welfare of the poor
Side effects of  Possible sources of increase  Possible mitigating factors and welfare gains
privatization  in cost burden for the poor  for the poor
The cost of  Revenue collection and  *  A formal connection, even at a cost, may be
increasing  discouragement of informal  a true aspiration of vulnerable households.
formality  connections are likely to be  *  Safety likely to increase with the
more effective and result in  formalization of connections.
increase in effective price  *  Informal connection may have been more
paid.  expensive.
*  Reform can bring technology choices that
lower costs.
The cost of  Average tariff levels can  *  Increase in average tariffs depends on pre-
tariff level  increase, due to cost recovery  reform price levels and the distribution of
adjustments  requirements and need to  the benefits of private participation between
finance quality related  stakeholders.
investments.  *  Reform can cut cost significantly enough
through improvements in efficiency or new
technologies.
The costs of  Tariff structures likely to be  *  Competition likely to decrease average
tariff  reformed in ways which could  tariffs and may also compensate for any
structure  increase the marginal tariff  tariff rebalancing that affects the poor.
adjustments  faced by a poor household.
The costs of  Privatization may restrict  *  Access to other types of alternative services
increasing the  access to some alternative  will  not be affected if foreseen in contracts.
price of  services, especially if  *  Availability of communal services may
substitutes  connection to public network  increase as a result of privatization.
is mandatory.
The costs of  The cost of obtaining a  *  The cost of obtaining other complementary
increasing the  connection to the  equipment is likely to be unaffected by
price of  infrastructure service is likely  privatization, but will remain high.
complements  to increase substantially.
The costs of  Quality of service likely to  *  There is considerable evidence showing that
improved  improve, but this may make  poor households are willing to pay
quality of  network services unaffordable  reasonable amounts to improve quality of
service  for the poor.  service.
Source: Adaptedfrom  Foster. (1999)
A similar observation can be made in Panama where close to 7% of the clients of IDAAN, the main
public water utility, were subsidized at a level of 100% of their bill at an annual cost of US$3 million
to the  company. Eligibility  for  this  subsidy  was  mainly based  on  a  poor  past  payment  record.
Therefore, this subsidy was implicitly a subsidy for non-payment (Foster et al. (2000)).Infrastructure for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor  7
But there are also examples  of countries  in which the poorest  formally unconnected  users get illegal
connection  from illegal providers and pay these illegal providers for services equivalent to those
offered  by the formal  operators.  In the Dominican  Republic  for instance,  flat fees are commonly  paid
by the poorest for illegal connections.  The recent privatization  of electricity distribution  is not yet
having  any effect, positive  or negative,  on the poor since  these households  were previously  paying  an
equivalent  amount to the current bills to informal operators.  The introduction  of a formal operator
concerned  with cost recovery  may simply  provide  them with an option and it is not unreasonable  to
assume  that the competition  between  the privatized  operator  and the informal operator  will result in
some type of competition  at the retail level which may end up cutting tariffs for the poorest, at least
until the private operator  takes over the business  in full. The evidence  of deaths in the Dominican
Republic  related  to improper  handling  of wires  by users  and the informal  connected  shows  that in the
case  of electricity,  informal  connections  also pose a safety  threat to the household  and the surrounding
community.  Therefore, even if the formalization  of the service and the concomitant increase in
expenditure  ends up being a direct  financial  loss to the household,  this impact  may be compensated  by
the increased  safety.  In the water sector  this may also be the case when, due to an illegal  connection,
there is a serious  reduction  in the quality  of the water  that reaches  the household. 6
More generally,  the coexistence  of informal and formal providers is often the result of inefficient
management  by public  utility companies-which are unable  to identify  and incorporate  many  of their
implicit customers-than a strategy pursued by poorer households  to obtain free services.  In fact,
there is  mounting evidence from Willingness-to-Pay  surveys undertaken in  Central and South
America indicating  that even very poor households  would prefer to pay a reasonable  bill in order to
have  a formal  connection  to piped  water services  than  maintain  an informal  connection.  This is partly
due to the uncertainty  regarding  the continuation  of access  to the service  faced by a household  that is
informally  or illegally  connected.  In other  cases, being a formal customer  of a utility,  certified  by the
presentation  of a water  or electricity  bill, may be necessary  in order  to obtain other state benefits  or in
order to proceed  with bureaucratic  processes  within the state apparatus.  For urban households  who
live in recently  created  shanty towns  without  proper  land titles, a formal  connection  to a utility,  even
at a cost, may  be a first step in the  direction  of formal  ownership  of the property.
2.1.2. Losing from changes in the tariff level and structure?
The inclusion  of users into the commercial  cadastre  of the companies  is only the most obvious  way in
which the poorest can be affected.  Their situation  may also be influenced  by the increase in average
tariffs that can stem from privatization. This is usually  the result of the need to make the utility
providers  financially  self-sufficient.  Prior to reform,  many utility companies  do not charge the true
cost of the service  and the resulting  financial  deficit  of this implicit universal  subsidy  is funded from
government  budgetary  resources.  Since  one of the motivating  forces for reform is often the reduction
in fiscal deficits,  privatization  will usually  be accompanied  by a rise in tariffs  in order to cover costs. 8
6  The crucial point in this argument is whether the household is aware and values the extra safety and health benefits of a
formal connection. If this is the case then the household would presumably be willing to pay for a formal service. However,
if the household does not value these benefits then it is a public health concern which may justify some type of subsidy for
the service. More on this later.
7  Often tariffs will increase prior to privatization as governments improve the financial conditions of the companies in order
to make them viable for privatization. This increase, although not coincidental with privatization in a temporal dimension,
can nevertheless be attributed to the privatization process.
8  Even if governments would  like to maintain low tariffs  in the context of  private participation and continue funding
operating deficits through government transfers, this would be quite risky for a private operator. A large fraction of the
operator's income would depend on the political vagaries of the budgetary process. Therefore, financial sufficiency may be a
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Privatization, however, does not always increase effective tariffs. The impact of a reform process on
prices will depend on the pre-reform tariff level and pricing formula as well as on how the benefits of
privatization  are  distributed  between  stakeholders.  In  particular,  who  receives  the  financial
compensation for the assets sold or concessioned depends on the tendering mechanism used to award
the contracts or utility company. When one of the main objectives of the reform is to reduce the fiscal
deficit, governments may be tempted to set a high tariff level and award the service to the private
investor who offers the highest up-front or annual transfer to the government. In some respects, high
tariffs in this case can be viewed as a tax on consumers to fund the fiscal deficit through a high sale
value of the company. If it hurts the poor disproportionately, it can be viewed as the result of taxation
rather than privatization per se. On the other hand, if a company is privatized to the bidder that offers
to  charge  the lowest  tariff,  then  consumers  would receive  more of  the  financial  rewards  of  the
reforms. This effect may even result in a reduction of average tariffs.
There is evidence from a survey of 600 concession contracts from around the world that in most cases
contracts are tendered for the highest transfer or annual fee, suggesting that governments tend to use
the auction to  address more  immediate fiscal concerns rather than  to  address  efficiency  concerns
which  would  more  directly  meet  the  need  of  the  consumers  including  users  (Guasch  (2000)).
However, some cases illustrate how  other stakeholders, and in particular consumers can gain from
lower  tariffs when  the  contracts  are tendered  according  to this  variable.  In  1992, the  water  and
sanitation services in  the Buenos  Aires Metropolitan Region  was concessioned  for  30  years. The
investment commitments were of the order of US$4,000 million during the period of the concession.
The contract was awarded to the company that offered  the lowest tariff.  As a  result, tariffs were
reduced on average by 26.9%. A few years into the concession there was a renegotiation process that
resulted in an increase in tariffs of 13.5% due to the need to bring forward the investment plans and
increase quality of service. However, the net result was still a fall in average tariffs after services were
concessioned which benefited all clients, including the poorest connected customers.
As for the effects of privatization on tariff levels and structures, they  will also depend on the degree
of competition in the post reform industry. Competition and effective regulation should serve to lower
costs  and  tariffs.  The evidence from  a  General  Equilibrium Model  for  Argentina  shows that  the
indirect gains from effective regulation of the utility industries tended to benefit the poorest income
groups  relatively more. 9 While  privatization itself tends to  benefit the new  owners and  hence  the
richest, the effective regulation of the new "private" monopolies cuts tariffs to their efficient levels
cutting costs  to other sectors of the economy, increasing demand for  their outputs and  generating
additional demand for key labor inputs, including employment  for the poor.
To the extent that privatization is a precondition for the introduction of competition, private sector
participation  may  have  substantial  effects  in  reducing  tariffs.  In  Chile,  when  the  long-distance
telecommunications market was liberalized in 1994, call prices dropped  more than  50% (80% for
large clients). A  drop in prices of a  similar magnitude occurred in  1998 in  the mobile  telephony
industry when  the  PCS  system  was introduced  and  the  number  of  mobile  telephone  companies
increased from 2 to 4. In the electricity sector, generating prices fell by 50% between 1988 and 1998.
This was due primarily  to the arrival of natural gas from Argentina  to fuel new Combined Cycle
Power plants and, therefore, cannot be attributed directly to the privatization process. However, the
question remains whether the gas pipeline, which was privately financed, would have been feasible
without the privatization of the generating industry. The fact is that the incidence of the gains is not
clear. Retail electricity tariffs have not fallen by the same magnitude as generating prices. Between
1988 and 1998 they only fell by  25%. This result shows the importance of competition in reducing
tariffs which in turn should benefit the poor (see Serra (2000)).
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In Argentina,  the effectiveness  of the restructuring  process and the success of the introduction  of
competition  was such that  the wholesale price of electricity in Argentina dropped from 48.76
US$/MWh  in 1992  to 25.67 US$/MWh  in 1997,  a drop of close to 50% in the five year period  after
privatization.  This was due to the intense  competition  in the generation  sector after the entry of new
generators  (this increased from 13 in  1992 to 44 in 1997). The retail price faced by residential
customers  (net of taxes) was on average  0.191 US$/kWh  (at constant 1997  prices) between 1970  and
1991,  but only 0.115 US$/kWh  in the five  years after  privatization  (1992-1997).  Although  part of this
40% drop in  final prices would probably have occurred without privatization, due to  general
tendencies  for electricity prices to fall, it is nonetheless  indicative that privatization  is not always
accompanied  by tariff increases. (Estache-Rodriguez-Pardina  (2000), FIEL (2000)).  In all of the
above cases, the critical variable  seems to be competition.  Privatization  is generally  a pre-condition
for competition  for political  reasons  but is not the key factor in cutting  tariffs. Competition,  however,
is.
Tariff structures  may also change  in ways  that may  be detrimental  to some vulnerable  groups  and not
only in poor countries  (see Box 2 for the UK experience).  Tariffs  can be differentiated  along  at least
two dimensions,  the category  of clients and the quantity  consumed  by an individual  client.  In the first
case, pre-reform  tariffs will usually  (but not always)  contain  an element of cross subsidy,  either from
commercial  or industrial customers  to domestic customers  or from more affluent customers  to less
affluent customers  (usually by the geographic  differentiation  of tariffs). On the quantity dimension,
tariffs may contain some type of lifeline rate or rising block structure to reduce bills of low
consumption  households.  In some instances,  tariffs do not include fixed charges in order to protect
households  with low consumption.  In the water sector, where increasing block tariffs have been
known  to have disappointing  effects,  practitioners  are now considering  the use of uniform  price with
rebate designs (IPR) in which a volumetric  charge set equal to marginal  cost is complemented  by a
fixed monthly  rebate (or a negative  fixed charge)  which  can be targeted  to the poorest and which can
be set to generate  enough,  but not excessive,  revenue  while  preserving  marginal  cost pricing.1 0
Finally,  with privatization  it will often  be advisable  to reduce  or eliminate  the implicit  cross-subsidies
in the tariff structure  or at least increase their transparency  through a redesign-for  governments
unable to raise the fiscal revenue  needed to finance explicit  subsidies.  Otherwise a private operator
will have an incentive  to expand  and serve customers  who generate  surplus to the detriment  of the
groups,  possibly  poorer, that receive  the subsidies.  If liberalization  brings competition  to the sector,
the natural incentive to "cream skim" by new entrants will force tariffs to be rebalanced  anyway.
However,  the net effect does not necessarily  result in higher  tariffs for vulnerable  households,  as the
UK gas experience  seems to show. In the Dominican  Republic  a similar  story can be told. Currently,
consumption  by the poorest  households  is in fact not measured.  They are charged  (whether  legally  or
illegally connected)  a flat fee. In many instances,  actual  consumption  billing would cost less to the
poor. The inclusion  of these users in the formal measured  network should cut the electricity  bill for
many  if priced  normally.
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Box 2: What reforming  developing  countries  can learn  on the cost  of service
to the poor from the UK experience in the gas sector
The UK gas experience illustrates the relevance of tariff structure. In that market there are three types
of customers: direct debit  customers (often wealthier) that pay  monthly installments automatically
through  their banking  accounts, standard credit  customers  that pay  a  quarterly  bill, pre-payment
customers who, either voluntarily or because of a bad payment record, use the more expensive pre-
payment meters that  work based  on coins or pre-payment cards. There  is an overrepresentation of
vulnerable  households  in  the  pre-payment  category  which  raises  concerns  regarding  any  tariff
rebalancing that would hurt this group of customers. British Gas has always posited that pre-payment
customers are more expensive to serve and that there is an implicit cross-subsidy in the tariff structure
benefiting this group. The regulator has often limited the extent to which British Gas (now British Gas
Trading-- BGT) could rebalance tariffs for different types of customers.
When competition was introduced in the residential market in 1997, the regulator imposed 'caps'  on
each of BGT's  tariffs to prevent the company from compensating for a reduction in prices to direct
debit  and credit  customers  by  increasing tariffs to pre-payment  customers.  Although  there  was a
statutory duty for  all  entrants to  offer service to both pre-payment  and  credit  customers, there  is
evidence that the new competitive firms were 'cream skimming'  by gearing their pricing structures
and marketing campaigns to credit customers and discouraging the service to prepayment customers.
This  forced BGT to  react by  offering discounts to its credit  customers, but tariffs to pre-payment
customers remained the same.
In July, BGT applied to the regulator to rebalance its tariffs by  increasing the cap on pre-payment
meter customers based on evidence on the cost differential to service each type of consumer. After a
cost study undertaken by the regulator, BGT decided to withdraw the application  since it was clear
that the regulator would reject the petition. In fact, the regulator forced BGT to lower its pre-payment
meter tariff in line with its standard credit tariff.
The net effect  of these policies is as follows. The initial tariff differential,  as of November  1997,
between  BGT  and competitors  shows that  debit  and  credit  customers  obtained  the  greatest tariff
reductions (17 and 16% respectively). Pre-payment meter customers also benefited but much less so
(4%). Next, after BGT revised  its tariffs downwards in 1998, the bill differentials were somewhat
lower, but pre-payment customers could gain by switching from BGT to some of the new competitors.
Overall, tariff rebalancing has been achieved with a general reduction  in overall prices.  Credit and
debit customers have gained most from the introduction of competition in the domestic gas market,
including many vulnerable households. Pre-payment customers have benefited as well, but less so.
2.1.3.  Losing  from  changes  in the prices  and availability  of substitutes  and
complements?
An unexpected effect of privatization on the poor is related to the prices and availability of substitute
and complementary goods. Substitute goods are those that provide alternative forms of energy, water,
light or communication. Table 3 provides some examples for each of the utility services. It is ironic
that in many cases, due to the shortcomings of public utility providers, the poor only have access to
utility services through these alternative goods, which for the most part are provided by the private
sector. Therefore, for many of these households privatization is not "so much a transition from public
sector to private sector provision, as a transition from informal private  sector provision  to formal
private sector provision".Infrastructure for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor  1I
Table 3: Substitutes for private household connections  to infrastructure services
_______________  Energy  Telecommunications  Water
Self-supply  Collection of firewood  Collection of river water
Construction of wells
Communal  Public telephones  Stand-pipes
supply
Alternative non-  Kerosene  Resale of telephone  Tanker supplies
network  Bottled gas  services  Bottled water
suppliers  Resale of piped water
Alternative  Inforrnal networks  Pagers  Informal networks
network  Mobile telephones
suppliers  Voice mail services
Source: Foster. (1999)
In general, privatization will be neutral with respect to the availability of substitute goods or even
increase the options and availability of communal supply. Whether in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, El
Salvador  or  the  Dominican  Republic,  private  operators  are  promoting  the  use  of  alternative
technologies in  the  power  sector.  Renewable  energy sources  are  the  upshot  of  a  public-private
partnership in an increasing number of  countries (Brazil, Bolivia, and the  Dominican Republic).
Cooperative arrangements have been introduced by some of the private distribution companies in poor
neighborhoods to increased the number of shared connections (see World Bank Argentina report in
1995).  The main exception has been in the water sector when reforms are accompanied by a legal
requirement prohibiting  self supply and the resale  of piped water and  where residential units are
obliged to connect to the formal public network. This was initially a problem in the Aguas Argentina
concession where the need to reduce losses in the network led the private operator to end informal
agreements for  the use of less reliable connections in the poorest neighborhoods, allowed by the
public provider prior to privatization.
Note that the end of the need to rely on substitutes may be  good news for many poor households.
Consider some figures on the price ratio between what poor unconnected urban households are paying
water vendors compared to the price charged by the public utility companies. They provide a stark
illustration of how the status quo in many utility industries does not benefit the poor and that the poor
are willing to pay quite significant amounts to access utilities. Poor households often pay over 10 or
20 times the price paid by connected households with regular service, thus highlighting the benefits
reaped by these households if services are expanded as a result of privatization (provided tariffs don't
increase by 10 or 20 times).
Table 4: Comp  ng prices paid by w  ter vendors and charges at public utilities
Country  City  Ratio of prices paid to vendor to public
utilities tariffs
Colombia  Cali  10
Ecuador  Guayaquil  20
Haiti  Port-au-Prince  17-100
Honduras  Tegucigalpa  16-34
Peru  Lima  17
Source: Gran (1993) cited by Tynan (2000)
Finally, the importance of the complementarity between some goods can be underestimated. To begin
with, it is worth noting that in many countries urban water is pumped to the apartments in most
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increased  reliability  and lower prices in electricity  are a major determinant  of improved  and cheaper
services  in water." But there is a second dimension  to complementarity.  When investment  is required
to connect to the network, privatization  may have an adverse  effect on the poor if households  are
legally  required  to connect  to the network  and there  are no connection  subsidies  or credit facilities  that
reduce the large up-front costs that households  must incur in order to connect.  This is a critical issue
in the water sector where connection  costs can be several hundreds  of dollars. In Buenos Aires for
instance, the concession  contract  charged new customers  the cost of the connection  plus part of the
cost of expanding  the secondary  network,  which totaled  between $1,100 and $1,500 per connection.
The operator  was allowed  to recover  its investments  in 2 years.  Many unconnected  customers  were
in areas with an average household income of about US$245 a month, i.e. among the poorest, and
were being asked  to contribute  almost  20% of their income  to these complementary  investments.
2.1.4. Losing from changes in the options for quality?
Finally,  privatization  will also affect  the quality  of service.  This may  have beneficial  effects on poorer
households  if the pre-reform  quality was inadequate,  especially  as regards the continuity  of service.
Privatization,  especially if accompanied  by the introduction  of competition, may also spur more
diversity  in the types of services  offered,  some of which may be more closely  tailored to the needs of
poorer households.  However,  quality improvements  may also be costly and will thus be reflected  in
higher tariffs, which may hurt the poor. The balance between quality and tariffs imposed by the
regulator  on a private provider  may be based on standards  relevant  for the average customer  and may
not be the adequate  balance  for poorer households.
In many instances,  the benefits poor households  derive from improved service provision may more
than compensate  for the impact  on tariffs.  This depends  on the exact magnitude  of the tariff increase,
although the evidence  shows that poor households  are usually  willing  to pay substantially  more  for a
reliable service than the pre-reform tariffs. This can be seen in evidence from willingness  to pay
surveys (WTP) conducted in  Central and South America that show that poorer households are
generally willing to pay for quality improvements.  For instance, between 1995 and  1998, ESA
Consultores  of Honduras undertook  several WTP surveys in Central and South America trying to
measure households attitudes and valuations regarding water and sanitation services.' 2 The main
conclusions  from these studies  included  the following  ones.
Where households  are not connected  there is a high willingness  to pay for a connection  to the public
network.  Usually  these households  spend  a significant  amount  of resources  for alternative  low quality
supplies  and are willing to pay to be connected.  For example,  in Tegucigalpa,  in 1995, unconnected
households spent an average of $10 a month for 3.7 cubic metres of  water. This expenditure
represented 7% of household income for a volume that is significantly below the recommended
minimum  of monthly basic consumption  of 15 cubic meters. These households  could reduce their
expenditure  and increase their consumption  if connected  to the public  supply network. Households  in
marginal  sectors  that were connected  but did not receive  a daily service,  were willing to pay $4.50  per
month  for a daily 4 hour service.  That represents  3% of average household  income and is three times
higher  than the tariff they paid at the time ($1.50).  Similar  WTP results were found in the other  cities.
11 Arguably, a privatization process may  even be beneficial to the poor if reform promotes  the development  of a more
dynamic and productive industry for these complementary goods. As such, privatization may increase the availability of low
cost durable goods for poor households.
12  The cities and dates of these studies are: Honduras-Tegucigalpa  (marginal neighborhoods),  1995; Nicaragua-Managua
(marginal  neighborhoods),  1996;  Venezuela-Caracas,  Barquisimeto,  Merida  (all  the  population),  1996;
Guatemala-Guatemala  City  (marginal  neighborhoods),  1997;  Venezuela-  Caracas  (marginal  neighborhoods),  1997;
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Where the quality  of service is relatively good, households are willing  to increase  their monthly
expenditure in order to reverse a deterioration of the service. In Caracas, for example, households
were willing to pay  up  to three  times their  tariffs at  the time to  maintain the  quality of  service.
Therefore, the fact that the poor end up paying more post privatization may not be welfare reducing.
2.2.  The  macroeconomic  linkages
The macroeconomic linkages between increased private sector participation and poverty are mostly
indirect as seen in Table 5. If more, and better, infrastructure financed privately promotes general
economic growth,  this will be  beneficial to the  poor (see  Kraai and  Dollar (2000)).  Also, if  the
reforms  reduce the  fiscal  deficit,  more resources  could be  allocated  to  more  progressive  public
expenditure programs. The magnitude and sign of the above effects will depend on the counterfactual
considered. That is, how much would the growth rate be without privatization and how would extra
fiscal resources be spent? The difficult problems arise during the transition. Significant changes in
relative prices throughout the economy needed to unleash growth can be very damaging to the least
prepared segments of the population.  Managing the effects of privatization on the relative price of
public services is one of the purposes of safety nets.
Table 5: Summary of macroeconomic linkages between increased
private sector participation in infrastructure and poverty
Macroeconomic  Expected negative impact on poverty  Ameliorating factors
effect
Economic  *  May result in difficult transition as  *  Over the medium to longer run,
growth  a result of  tariff rebalancing and  increased private sector
service mix changes (more or less  participation in infrastructure
standardization) which does not  should contribute to growth which
address the needs of the poor, in  in turn tends to reduce poverty
particular when there are no safety  levels.
______  __  nets  in place.
Reduction in  *  Workforce often reduced soon  *  Depends to what extent poor
employment  after privatization.  households were employed by
*  Wages may also decrease for some  public enterprises and on the
of the workers during a transition  nature of the compensation
period.  provided to workers laid-off.
Reallocation of  *  Reduction in  overall subsidy  *  "Privatization revenue" and better
public  allocation during transition as a  targeting may ease financing of the
expenditure  result of fiscal adjustment may  needs of the real poor.
reflect lower priorities for
I  privatized  utilities.
Source:Adapted  from Foster. (1999)
A  second  and  more  direct  effect  might  be  the  reduction  in  employment  associated  with  the
privatization of a public utility company. Both theory and evidence point to a significant reduction in
employment  after privatization-although  there  is  also  growing  evidence,  in  the  Argentine  and
Mexican transport sectors for instance,  that in some sectors, employment will eventually pick up with
business. In addition, wages may  also be reduced. It is however not possible to make any general
assertion regarding these effects since they will depend on the employment structure of the company,
but also on the flexibility of the labor market and on the relative wages  in the utility and outside.
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the implementation of the  privatization of utilities could best be explained by the rationing of the
credit market which prevented the adjustment needed to absorb excess labor.
Finally, it may be worth pointing out that changes in subsidy policies may be intended to help the
poor but may also cause damage during the transition. It is quite common that a key companion of a
privatization policy is a fiscal adjustment. Most fiscal adjustments end up reducing subsidies-at  least
initially. This cut in subsidy is commonly handled in a way to keep matters simple and are close to
cuts-across the board. This lack of discrimination is a rational source of concern for the poorest, even
if they only get a modest share of these subsidies and is often an unbearable price to pay to achieve
the longer run gains from reform.
2.3.  Concluding on what the facts tell about the linkages between
"privatization" and the poor
The main conclusion to emerge from this  review of the Latin American experience is that the relation
between  "privatization"  and the poor is complex and in general ambiguous.  The evidence on this
point  is sketchy  and  incomplete  because there  is no  policy  tradition  of trying  to figure  out the
expected  outcomes  of  reform  ex-ante.  Often  privatization  requires  swift  action  that  must  be
accomplished without the benefit of a detailed cost benefit analysis by group. The deal (i.e. signing a
contract) is what matters to most governments and at best the winners and the losers who matter are in
terms of the next election or in terms of getting the deal done. Much more needs to be researched in
this  area  and  in  view  of  the  large  number  of  contract  renegotiations,  much  more  needs  to  be
anticipated in this respect by politicians as well.
In addition  to the  relevance  of measuring  and  simulating  the consequences  of reform,  the  main
general conclusions that can be drawn so far are the following:
*  It is a myth to believe that status quo arrangements in the utility industries (i.e. public provision)
is beneficial to poor households. Indeed, many poor would benefit from the service expansion that
may be possible through privatization  and which would allow them  to avoid the high costs  of
alternative sources.
*  It is  a  myth that  existing  subsidies benefit  the poor;  the middle  class  tends to  be  the main
beneficiary.
*  It is  a myth that poor households are not willing or able to pay for a regular and reliable service.
Many of these households currently pay much more for a deficient service from private vendors
(in the case of water) or alternative sources (in the case of energy) than they would from a public
provider.
*  It  is a  myth that  there is  no role  for government once  the private  sector  takes over  utilities
services. The way markets are restructured, the way competition is introduced and maintained and
the way regulatory commitments are implemented determine whether privatization is beneficial to
households.
*  The weaker the regulatory structure, the less likely generally that the concerns of the poor will be
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3.  HOW TO MAINSTREAM  THE MEASUREMENT  OF THE  EXPECTED
EFFECTS  OF REFORM
There are no quantitative  rules of thumb  that lead the hopes and fears of policymakers.  Nevertheless,
it is clear that the effects of privatization  on the poor will depend on the particular situation of a
country and the details of the reform  process. Once more this is why as a first step policymakers
should  try to ascertain  and measure  the potential  impacts  of the reforms  on the poor. This would  entail
trying  to answer  quite specifically  the following  two main  questions:
*  Who is benefiting  from status quo implicit  and explicit  subsidies?  Are they poor? We have seen
that  many of  the "academic" studies of  the effectiveness  of  subsidies targeting,  prior to
privatization  suggest that the poor are not the main beneficiaries.  It is inconceivable  that any
privatization  program for water or electricity  for instance would not try to measure the likely
distributional  impact of changes including changes to  subsidy designs and programs. This
requires  an analysis  of the tariff structure,  implicit  subsidies  and explicit  subsidies  of the current
service  provider  and try to gauge  the socioeconomic  status  of the benefited  households. 13
*  Are the poorer households  connected  to the service?  This is a crucial question  that needs to be
addressed  in order to clarify the potential  impacts of the reform process on the poor. If not, are
they paying informally?  What is the true economic  value of access, taking into account social
benefits  or externalities?
Ideally the answer  to these two questions would  entail a comparison  of the welfare  of the poor with
reform and without  reform.  At least in principle,  all the welfare  impacts  of the microeconomic  effects
mentioned  above  can be measured  using a simple  consumer  surplus  framework.  But this is not just an
academic  exercise. Generating  the information  serves two purposes.  First, it can be used to inform
public opinion  regarding  the true effects of the privatization  process. Second, it would generate  the
needed information  in order to design the optimal policy tools to counter any undesirable social
impacts  of the reform.
Why then is it that some of the most creative and politically  astute governments  in the developing
world have not measured  these impacts  in order to better inform  their electorate  and better help their
poor. While there are good political  economy  answers  (including  some tough questions  regarding  the
relative political  strength  of the winners  and the losers  from the policies that hurt the poor and some
related  governance  issues),  the focus of our discussion  is more "mundane"  and aims at addressing  the
analytical  obstacles  to measurement.  In this respect,  the main  obstacle  in this direction  is the weakness
of the data available to evaluate  the relationship  between  infrastructure  provision and the poor. To
measure  the microeconomic  impacts,  ideally  a researcher  would  need  a data set that contains:
*  household  level observations  on a wide range  of socioeconomic  variables;
*  information  on expenditure  and physical  consumption  of utility services;  and
*  information  on households  not connected  or informally  connected  to services.
This type of data would permit the simulation  of the welfare  impacts  of different  tariffs,  subsidy  and
connection  policies  related  to reform.  For example,  rising  block tariffs  might be proposed  as a way to
harmonize  distributive  objectives  with economic  efficiency  and financial  sustainability  of the service
provider.  The unit price of the service  would  be cheaper  for the first units of consumption,  up to the
level considered  sufficient  for the basic  needs of a poor household.  All users benefit from this cheap
13  For a study in this direction see Gomez-Lobo et al. (1998) where an analysis of the impacts of current subsidies was
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tariff. Consumption in  subsequent  blocks could then  be charged  at  their true  economic costs  or
higher. The efficiency and effectiveness of these types of social tariffs will depend on the correlation
between household physical consumption  and household poverty  levels. In order to  evaluate this
correlation-so  that the exact  size of the first block can be established  fairly-a  database  which
records for each household both socio-econornic variables-is  required to evaluate poverty-but  also
physical  consumption  of  utility services. This  approach has  been  adopted  for  water services  in
Cartagena, Colombia-where  in  1998, the maximum rate, USctsO.86/cubic meter, is about 7 time
larger  than  the  first  block  rate,  0.12  UScts/cubic  meter-and  in  Panama  City  where  the  tariff
differentiation  is  done  by  type  of  users,  social  (in  1998,  USctsO.18/cubic  meter),  residential
(USctsO.21-0.43)  and commercial (USctsO.30-48).
More generally, a household level database containing both socio-economic information and physical
consumption  would be an extremely useful tool for evaluating impacts and designing  measures to
counter negative effects on the poor. However, such a dataset is rarely available, even in developed
countries. Most countries undertake household level surveys-many  following the  methodology of
the  Living  Standards Measurement  Study  (LSMS) survey methodology  sponsored  by  the World
Bank-which  are invaluable  instruments to  measure poverty,  evaluate impacts  of different  social
programs and to design well targeted subsidy schemes. However, as regards the infrastructure sector,
these surveys have  some serious shortcomings.1 4 LSMS record a large  number of socio-economic
variables which can be used to ascertain the poverty level of the sampled  households. As regards
water usage, all surveys incorporate a question on the amount the household spent on water services
during the last month or the last payment period, although they do not tend to record the volume of
water consumed.'5 As such, the only way that physical water use can be inferred from the information
collected in the LSMS is to transform the monetary expenditure into a physical consumption variable
by applying the corresponding tariff structure to the household's declared water bill.
The deficiencies with the  LSMS Survey methodology as regards the  infrastructure sectors can be
illustrated in the case of water in Panama where a conscious effort was made to anticipate the needs of
the  poor  in  the preparation  of  privatization.  Experience  with  applying  this  approach in  Panama
revealed that the expenditure information was deficient in a number of respects, which made it very
difficult to draw reliable inferences about the physical volume of consumption. In particular,  these
include the following problems.
*  The fact that there  are multiple tariff structures applied to residential  customers and that the
survey did not contain any information on which tariff applies to which household.
*  The  absence  of  a  variable  identifying  whether the  household  has  measured  water  supply.
Therefore, it is impossible  to know  whether the expenditure  transformation  gives  actual or
imputed water consumption.
*  The quality of the expenditure data can be poor. Where the household was not able to produce a
recent water bill, the estimate is based on memory. In these cases, it is not always clear whether
the  estimated consumption  includes  the charge for  refuse  collection,  which  in  the  case  of
Panama is billed together with the water service.
14 See for example G6mez-Lobo, Foster and Halpern (1999) for an analysis of the problems of the LSMS surveys related to
water and sanitation.
15 Other water related questions in LSMS include the source of water supply, the average number of hours a day in which a
dwelling receives water, and whether there is a sewerage connection. Other questions that are sometimes included are the
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To illustrate  this last  point raised  above,  consider  the quality  of the water  expenditure  data of the 1997
LSMS Panama.  In order to gauge how substantial  the divergence  might be between actual water
expenditure  and that reported in the survey, histograms  were plotted comparing the frequency
distribution  of expenditure  in the survey as against  the client database of the Panama  water utility,
IDAAN.  The resulting  distributions  for the standard  residential  tariff and the special social  tariff are
presented  in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 respectively.  In both cases, there is a striking contrast  between  the
two distributions.  The key differences  are as follows.
*  The distribution  of expenditure  from the client database shows a marked concentration  of
households around the B./4.26, B./4.60,  B./5.68 and B./ 8.00 (US$ 4.26 to US$ 8.00) mark,
which represents  the minimum  charge payable (depending  on the specific tariff structure).
Moreover,  the vast majority  of clients seem to have bills around this level. Neither of these
features  is found in the distribution  of expenditure  from the LSMS survey, which presents a
much  flatter  distribution  of expenditure.
*  Furthermore,  in the first figure, there is a slight  spike in the distribution  at around the B./12
(US$12)  mark.  Interestingly,  this is exactly  the  level of expenditure  that a residential  household
would incur if refuse collection  charges  were not subtracted  from the water bill (B./6.40  for
minimum  water consumption  on the standard  tariff, and B./5.60 for refuse collection).  This is
suggestive  of mistaken inclusion  of the refuse collection  charge in a significant  number  of
cases.
Figure  3.1: Monthly  water  bill distribution  from  different  information  sources,
standard  residential  customer,  Panama
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Figure 3.2: Monthly  water  bill distribution  from different  information  sources,





0* , 1 0 i;  =
0  2.1  4.3  6.4  8.5  10.7  12.8  14.9  17.0  19.2  21.3
Monthly Water Bill (B./)
OfDAAN E LSMS
Source: G6mez-Lobo, Foster and Halpern (1999)
Fortunately, these  deficiencies can  be eliminated by  relatively inexpensive  changes  to the  survey
design and  implementation.'6 Until that  is done, however, there  will be a  lack of suitable data to
analyze the social impacts of sectoral reforms in the infrastructure sector. There is still much that a
creative analyst can do to try to answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section, even if
poor or incomplete data is available.  Komives, Whittington and Wu (2000) show how to squeeze as
much information as possible from these LSMS. But more needs to be done. Foster (2000) suggests
an expansion of the standard questionnaires used to collect the required  information-and  provides
some guidelines  as to  how  to  go  about it-but  this  collection  is  impossible  without  a  political
commitment that may be harder to achieve in view of the stakes for some of the beneficiaries of the
unfair policies.
4.  IS THERE  A REAL CASE FOR A SPECIAL  WELFARE  POLICY  IN THE
INFRASTRUCTURE  SECTOR?
To motivate the discussion, it may be useful to see how the potential costs of not having a special
welfare policy work out in practice with the help of a recent crisis in Argentina. In 1995 the water and
sanitation services for the Province of Tucuman in Argentina were concessioned to a consortium of
Compagnie Generale des Eaux and  a local investor for  30 years. To fund the required investment
program, the concessionaire bid a tariff increase of 68%. The tariff increase would be immediate and
would affect all customer groups equally in a population with a significant share of urban and rural
poor. With  hindsight, this last characteristic of the winning bid was probably a misjudgment. The
tariff  increase proved  very  unpopular  and was considered  unjust  by  low  consumption  users. The
situation  deteriorated  with  a  series  of  episodes  of  turbid  water.  The  result  was  a  non-payment
campaign by consumers which provoked a financial crises for the concessionaire. Provincial elections
brought to power a new administration which was much more hostile to the concession program. At
first  the  authorities and  the  concessionaire  began  negotiating  the  contract. One  initiative  was to
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introduce  a  special tariff  for  low  income users  and  a  system  of rising  block  tariffs  for  regular
customers. However, the negotiations did not prosper and the case ended in international arbitration.
This example illustrates the challenges of addressing  social issues in  the context  of privatization.
Although the causes of the failure of the Tucuman water concession are many and complex, perhaps
earlier  attention  to  the  social  and  distributive issues  related  to  the  tariff  increases  would  have
increased the chances  of  success  or  an explicit  subsidy program  would  have  helped  diffuse the
explosive  situation.  However,  the  main  problem  may  have  been  that  the  government  had  not
addressed the poverty issue as part of its general welfare program and was trying to get the job done
through the renegotiation of the design of the concession.
More  generally,  the  following  generic questions  should be  addressed  in  the  context  of  utilities
privatization  in developing  countries  in  general and  Latin  America  in  particular.  The very  first
question is whether as a matter of principle, the linkages between poverty and infrastructure in general
should simply be viewed as just  another  manifestation of poverty in a generic sense and, as such,
should be tackled through the general welfare system? In general, the answer will be positive. But the
more pressing question is: given that there is no credible general welfare  policy in most countries
about to reform, if a serious analysis of the situation raises legitimate concerns regarding the impact of
reforms on the poor, is there a real case for welfare policies in the infrastructure sector at least in the
short to medium run? More specifically, should changes in the utility industries warrant special policy
measures  in  these  industries,  and  should  this  response  link  any  potential  transfer  to  actual
consumption of the utility services. In sum, are the "fuel poor"-a  term used in the United Kingdom
to  refer  to  vulnerable households  that  under  consume energy  resources-any  different  from the
"general poor"? 17
More generally, what these questions suggest is that linking welfare programs to changes in the utility
industries is quite complex. First, it is quite difficult to isolate the effects on the poor of changes in
utilities from the effects of other simultaneous policy changes and an explicit link to utilities  could
generate a situation where economic welfare effects are evaluated and countered in isolation without
proper consideration of these multiple effects. For example, it is not uncommon for privatization to
raise tariffs faced by poor households, but other changes in the economy (possibly indirectly linked to
the privatization process, such as higher economic growth) may compensate for this effect. Second,
welfare programs aimed at utility consumers would not reach the unconnected poor, which in some
cases can be a substantial proportion of vulnerable households. An alternative is to consider more
general poverty alleviation programs which may be more efficient in gauging the overall net impact of
economic  conditions  on  vulnerable  households,  in  establishing  the  appropriate  welfare  benefits
required and in targeting benefits to the truly needy. This seems promising but make take too long to
implement.
This  discussion  begs  the  recognition of  a  final issue,  more  institutional  in  nature.  Once social
objectives have been recognized as important and once the limits of general welfare systems have
been recognized, should utility regulators have social and welfare objectives in their statutory duties?
Some critics, such as Vickers (1998), argue that "the  advantages of regulators  having  discretion to
pursue  distributional  ends  are  outweighed  by  disadvantages  of  capture,  influence  activities,
uncertainty  and  unaccountability.  Regulators,  perhaps like  central  bankers,  should  have  focused
objectives". At first then, it would seem that the distributional impacts of utility reform  should be
17 It may also be worth wondering if the special treatment to be granted to the fuel poor is based on society's judgement that
access  to  utilities is desirable  from  a  more  "philosophical"  viewpoint-a  merit good  argument  in the  public  finance
literature-or  is it based on more technical assessments of the needs of the poor since this would have to influence the design
of the privatization strategy since the valuation of the activities are no longer based on commercial or social criteria alone.20  Utility Privatization  and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enoueh to Get It right?
tackled  through more general welfare  policies aimed at alleviating  poverty, and therefore should  not
be addressed  directly  in the utility  industries  nor should  they  be part  of the concerns  of the regulator.
Before looking into the options available to rely on utilities to implement the focused objectives
chosen by politicians, it is worth revisiting a question currently haunting many reformers: how
realistic  is it to expect that the government  will be able to put together  general welfare  policies which
will support  privatization  policies.
4.1.  The conventional public economics wisdom: let the government take
care of the poor
Conventional  public economic  wisdom suggests  that the most efficient tax/benefit  system would be
one based on lump-sum  transfers.  This means  that it assumes  that governments  have the ability  to not
only raise taxes  without  distorting  static and dynamic  resource  allocation  decisions  but that in addition
they know  exactly  who the poor are and how to get the money  to these poor to help them have access
to potential  welfare  gains. Few would  argue  that this is a realistic  option  in practice
In most developing  countries,  the tax system  is usually  quite inefficient  and unable to raise resources
at a low enough cost to enable sufficient  funding  of a welfare  system. While distortions  to raise taxes
and to transfer  income  are difficult  to avoid, taxes  should be introduced  where they cause the lowest
welfare  loss. The rule of thumb  is that distortions  should  be applied to goods and activities  with low
demand or supply elasticities-known as the Ramsey  pricing rule. On the demand side, this can be
quite dramatic since the poorest often are likely to have few reasonable alternatives  to the services
offered  by the utilities  and hence social  and efficiency  consideration  would crash into each other.
To decide  how hard to try to rely on the general  welfare  system to address  the need of the poorest  in
the infrastructure  sector,  it is worth considering  what public finance  economists  call the cost of public
funds.  It measures  the efficiency  of the tax system  of a country.  The cost of public funds  is the welfare
loss that occurs when an additional  unit of tax is raised to fund an expenditure  program.  It is positive
because as, we just saw, taxes tend to distort some resource allocation  decisions  in the economy.' 8
Most developed  countries  have  costs of public funds  between  0.15 and 0.35, meaning that to raise one
additional  dollar in taxes costs the economy 1.15 to 1.35 dollars. The higher this cost, the more a
welfare  program  funded through utility prices is likely to be the way forward. Indeed, while efforts
should be geared to improve the welfare system, time is often quite pressing in the privatization
context and short run alternatives are needed and  addressing poverty problems directly in the
infrastructure  sectors  may well  be more  efficient.
4.2.  Towards a new conventional wisdom: make the utilities  take care of the
poor
The common practice of using two-part tariffs in utility industries opens up the possibility of
following a Ramsey recipe. The connection and disconnection  elasticity for utility services is
probably  very inelastic  for a broad range of the income  distribution.  Therefore,  taxing and transferring
la A common source of distortion influencing the opportunity cost of public funds arises  in capital markets because the
financing of an expenditure program may end up crowding out private investments. The percentage difference between the
present value of  the stream of  consumption that the private investment  would have yielded  and the present value of the
consumption allowed by the expenditure program is one way of measuring the deadweight loss of a specific program. More
"macro" measures are also used in the literature. For a more detailed discussion see Boadway and Wildasin (1984),  Ahmad
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income through the design of tariffs and in particular through the design of the fixed charges of utility
bills may well be very efficient, at least for some limited range of tax values. Fixed charges in utility
tariffs will be very close to true "lump sum" taxes if the disconnection elasticity is low, which is
probably  the  case  for  most  households.  Therefore,  implementing  welfare  programs  through  a
transparent cross subsidy in the utility rates, especially if undertaken such that only fixed charges are
affected, may  well be more efficient than  a general poverty alleviation  program undertaken with
general tax funds.
This has implications not only for the efficient design of utility subsidy programs-where  taxes or
transfers should be based on the fixed charges of tariffs as much as possible-but  it also opens up the
possibility of using this  vehicle for other poverty alleviation programs.19 Indeed, tailoring welfare
programs to the utility industries allows benefits to be linked or conditioned on the consumption of
utility services. At first, this may seem as sub-optimal, given that unconditional cash transfers, such as
raising the minimum wage or increasing benefit payments from other poverty alleviation programs,
should increase the utility of households, since they are then free to spend the extra resources as they
freely wish. However, there are several reasons why benefits in the utility industries should be linked
to the actual consumption of the services.
First, policy makers may be interested in guaranteeing that households consume a minimum amount
of a service rather than simply guarantee that they have sufficient monetary resources to potentially
purchase the  services.  This  argument  may  be  relevant  where  individual  consumption  provides
important social externalities, such as the public health benefits of water and sanitation. It is probably
less  relevant  for  electricity  and  gas.  Another  type  of  consumption  externality  occurs  in  the
telecommunications industry, where the value of the service to all users increase with the aggregate
number of  users. In these  cases,  the social value  of consumption  (or  connection in the  case  of
telecommunications) is higher than the private value. 20 Therefore, welfare transfers linked directly to
observed consumption may be preferable to unconditional transfers to vulnerable households.
Second, as mentioned in  Serra (2000), it may be that the consumption of certain  goods by  poor
households enter directly the social welfare function of society. 21 In other words, the general public
may care about the actual consumption of certain goods by poor households not necessarily their
income level. Therefore, equivalent cash transfers would not be a perfect substitute from a social point
of  view. This  situation  may  also  determine  the  way  vulnerable  groups  articulate  their  welfare
demands, since a petition for subsidies directly linked to utility services may  have more political
resonance than cash transfers.
Third, some welfare programs that transfer goods rather than monetary resources may be less prone to
fraud. This is because the value of the good to each household will be different. Say, for example, that
vulnerable households are given a subsidy for their electricity consumption provided they consume
less than  a predetermined amount. If consumption is correlated with income, relatively wealthier
households would not have an incentive to apply compared to a program that gave unconditional cash
transfers.
Fourth, introducing distributive considerations into a reform process, perhaps by designing a special
welfare program, may be unavoidable for political reasons. The success of the privatization process
may depend  on  such  a  policy, even  when strict  welfare considerations  may  not justify  it.  This
19 See C. Waddams (2000) for a recent review.
20  This  argument  also  justifies  the imposition  of universal  service  obligation  considered  now to be a standard  to address  the
needs  of the  poor (see Chisari-Estache  (1999)  for a discussion  of the design  of these  obligations).
21  Arguably,  this may  just be another  case of consumption  externality,  where  the consumption  of one household  enters  the
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approach to welfare policy design may not be very recommendable since it risks  generating public
transfers that benefit particular interest groups and not necessarily the most needy. However, as the
experience in Tucuman suggests, disregarding social issues altogether can be a very risky strategy for
a reform process.
In summary, there is a case for adverse distributional effects to be addressed directly in the utility
industries  with  measures  aimed  at  lowering the  financial  burden  on  vulnerable  households  that
22 consume the services.  However, this does not necessarily entail that a utility regulator designs and
administers the welfare program. On the contrary, it is advisable that as far as possible these programs
be  integrated  into  the  general  welfare  and  poverty  alleviation  policies  of  a  government,  thus
maintaining coherence with complementary poverty reduction efforts and to guarantee efficient and
encompassing eligibility assessments.
The  Chilean  water  subsidy  scheme  and  the  Colombian  residential  utility  subsidy  provide  two
examples of designs in which policies in the utility industry are integrated  to more general welfare
policies of a government. In the first case, it is the Ministry  of Planning (MIDEPLAN), the social
welfare ministry, and not the water regulator who determines the number of subsidies allocated to
each region.  This allocation is based  on yearly household surveys that portray  the  socioeconomic
conditions of each zone, the water tariff in each area, and fiscal budgetary constraints. This evaluation
is better undertaken at a central level by an organism with expertise in poverty and social issues. Once
the number of subsidies is determined at an aggregate level, it is up  to the municipalities in each
region  to  distribute  these  subsidies  to  eligible  households.  This  is  undertaken  using  the  same
socioeconomic  assessment  instrument  as  any  other  public  subsidy,  a  "poverty  score".  This  is  a
numerical  synthesis of a poverty  assessment exercise  based on  a household  interview by  a  social
worker. A household's poverty score is used to determine eligibility to almost all public subsidies and
therefore  guarantees  that  all  poverty  alleviation  measures  are  correctly  targeted.  In  Colombia,
households receive a  subsidy (or a tax  in the case of wealthier households) for  all utility services
based  on  the  geographic  location  of  a  dwelling.  There  are  six  categories  depending  on  the
characteristics of neighborhoods. The important point  to note  is that  the category  of each zone is
determined by  the Secretariat of Planning based on census data and other information. This means
that one prerequisite for using the tariff for redistributive purposes is an accurate poverty mapping.
This is, however, proving to be a challenging task as discussed later.
5.  WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS/GUIDELINES TO MINIMIZE  THE RISK OF
LOSSES BY THE POOR
Recognizing that social issues should be an integral part of a successful privatization  strategy in the
utility  sector,  what  would  be  some  of the  guidelines  that  policy  makers  should  consider  when
designing  reforms?  The  first  task  is  to  generate  the  needed  information  to  make  an  informed
judgement as to the true potential impact of reform on the poor. Once armed with this knowledge is it
possible to distinguish the groups affected, characterize the nature of the impact (via possible tariff
increases or some other effect) and devise effective and efficient counter  measures. As for possible
policy actions, three broad spheres of public policy can be distinguished:  the privatization strategy,
regulatory policy and social policy. These three areas should be viewed as complementary, although
the  timing and  institutional  responsibility may  be different  in each  case.  Privatization policy  and
social policy actions have to be considered early in the reform process and will probably be the task of
institutions distinct from the regulatory agency but they need to be specified first to ensure that the
regulatory concerns are  consistent  with the privatization  and  social goals.  Any  future changes  in
policies  and social priorities should also be anticipated and regulatory rules providing guidelines to
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address this kind of situation are likely to be part of the more general rules regarding renegotiation of
the commitments made to the private operator at the time of privatization. 23
5.1.  Privatization strategy
The evidence shows that in general, competition will be good for all consumers, including the poor.
This reinforces the need to undertake structural and regulatory reforms that promote competition, such
as vertical and horizontal separation, elimination of exclusivity clauses in contracts and laws, and the
development of a  regulatory 'culture'  that promotes competition. These recommendations are also
worthy from  a  strictly efficiency  viewpoint,  a case  where  efficiency  considerations  and  welfare
considerations coincide.
The only drawback that competition may  have is that it forces the elimination of cross-subsidies,
which may hurt the poor. However, the impact of the general fall in tariffs or the greater variety of
services which  may  accompany competition  may  more  than  compensate  for  the  effects  of  the
elimination of cross subsidies. Furthermore, it is still possible to maintain internally generated cross
subsidies even in the face of competition through the creation of a universal welfare fund or to use
Chilean style targeted subsidies outside of the tariff formula. 24
Another area which deserves careful attention is the investment and quality targets that are set at the
time  of privatization,  especially in  a  concession contract as part of  the definition  of the service
obligations imposed  on  the  operators. It  will often  be  the  case  that  poorer  households are  not
connected to  the service,  therefore the connection targets set prior to  privatization  may have  an
important impact on the poor. If tariffs are sufficiently high so that it is profitable to serve poorer
households, then  a  private  company  should extend services  to  these  households  out  of its  self
interest-as  happened in the residential telecommunications market in Chile, for example. However,
if the economics from the viewpoint of the operators make it unprofitable to serve more vulnerable
households, then it may be convenient to specify investment targets in the contract. These connection
targets must specify the geographic area or the type of customer who should benefit. Furthermore, the
regulator will need to monitor the company to guarantee that such commitments are honored. In the
La Paz-El Alto water concession there is an explicit number of new connections mandated for water,
with  specific  neighborhood  targets  in  fringe  areas.  There  are  percentage  coverage  targets  for
sewerage. In Monteria, Colombia, specific water and sewerage expansion targets were set. Similar
targets can be found throughout Latin American concessions.
The setting of quality standards also impacts on the poor. The recommendation here is to avoid setting
targets based on developed country benchmarks that may make the service too expensive for poorer
households. Flexibility may be in order as regards this issue. This means leaving some flexibility in
the contract to  allow the  company, the  regulator and  users in  the  future to  agree  to  a different
price/quality combination when it is convenient. This does not imply that quality standards should not
be set in the contract, which may give an incentive for a company to reduce cost by eroding quality,
23  The arrival of the Blair administration resulted in such changes and an increase  in social concerns and these  were
addressed without changing the financial equation faced by the private operators. Similar changes are occurring in Argentina
and Chile with the arrival of Presidents De la Rua and Lagos respectively and a UK type strategy to introduce the changes is
likely being considered in both countries.
24  A recent report by Cremer, Gasmi and Laffont (1998) provide detailed examples from many OECD countries in all
sectors. For a longer discussion of  universal social funds see Chisari and Estache (1999).
25  Mandatory connection requirements in the sectoral laws should also be given careful thought. This is usually an issue in
the water and sanitation sector, where public health considerations make this a reasonable requirement. However, connection
charges, unless subsidized, could be an enormous financial obstacle for poorer households. See Esrey(1996).24  Utility Privatization  and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enough to Get It rieht?
but rather, leaving the door open allows, in certain specific circumstances  (for example, when the
representative  leaders  of a community  demand  it), the company,  with due sanction  from the regulator,
to alter the price/quality  combination  for that community  to improve  efficiency  within the same  cost
parameters.  6
It is important  to eliminate  any legal obstacle  that may prevent  more  innovative  or alternative  projects
from being implemented.  Although  it may be the task of the future  regulator  to promote  such projects,
it is important  to avoid at the outset any legal constraint  in the contract  which may limit this type of
initiative  in the future.  One way of doing so is the inclusion  of the clear specification  of the universal
service obligations  (USO) in the scope of responsibilities  of the monopolies.  USO is an obligation
imposed  on the provider  of infrastructure  services.  It ensures  anyone  in their service  area the access  to
an affordable minimum level of a standard quality service bundle. This does not mean that the
provider has to  deliver access to  the infrastructure  network which would be  a  more specific
requirement.  This distinction is important in  the case of  water for  instance, where alternative
technologies  can provide  more effective  ways of meeting  the needs  of the poor. But this requires  more
flexibility  than most large utilities are typically willing to offer. One of the best known successful
examples  is the condominium  system  adopted  in the Northeast  of Brazil for the delivery  of sanitation
services.  It is essentially  a negotiated  co-ownership  agreement  for a small community  of users  of local
public services. The negotiation  allows the adjustment  of preferences  to the form of supply of the
service  which explains why very different sewer systems can co-exist in cities such as Fortaleza  or
Recife.
A major source  of concern  for potential  investors  is that sometimes  "affordable"  means  at a price that
may not necessarily  cover the cost of delivering  the service.  Moreover,  the precise definition  of the
range  of services  to be covered  through  the obligation  varies  from sector  to sector  and from country  to
country. In addition, who the main beneficiaries  of the USO are can vary. USO obligations  may
address spatial or geographical  differences,  specifying  for instance  that rural areas or inner cities are
to be serviced  just like richer urban areas. The USO is then said to be aiming at benefiting  high cost-
customers.  It can also be focusing  on criteria  more  related  to the income  level of the potential  users or
to specific demographic  or institutional characteristics  (retirees, schools, hospitals). Low income
groups  for instance  cannot necessarily  afford the connection  costs to a water main at prices that other
income  groups can afford. Moreover,  they typically  cannot  borrow either-because of capital market
imperfections  in many  developing  countries-which further  limits their access  to these services.
Attention should also be paid to the way a contract or company is tendered in the privatization
process. As mentioned  earlier, the variable  chosen to award the company or contract  will determine
the distribution of benefits between all stakeholders,  including poor users. Choosing a tendering
mechanism  is a complex issue, which should cover many considerations.  However, as regards the
poor, the following  rule of thumb should be borne in mind: if poor households  are connected  to the
service,  then they will benefit more  if tariffs are chosen as the competitive  variable,  while if they are
unconnected,  then choosing  investment  commitments  as the tendering  variable  has a higher  potential
of benefiting  the  poor.
5.2.  Regulatory  policy
Earlier,  we argued  that it would  be best that the regulator's duties  should not include distributional  or
welfare objectives.  However,  there are many actions and decisions within the traditional sphere of
activities  of a regulatory  that can enhance the benefits  that poorer households  can obtain from utility
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reform. If the reformers  go for flexibility  this should  be given in laws and contracts  regarding  the
price/quality  combination,  regulators  should  mirror this flexibility in their regulatory  decision.  This
would entail allowing  for different  combinations  of these variables  in different circumstances.  It is
important  that  regulators  be careful  to sanction  sub-average  quality  standards  only when  there is a real
social  demand  from the community  in this respect  and not as a way for a private  company  to increase
its profitability  by reducing  quality.  27
Related  to the above  point,  regulators  should  be reasonably  open to new and innovative  approaches  to
solve investment and  operational issues related to  poorer users. These include, for example,
community  participation  in the construction  and operation  of networks  which may reduce their cost,
the supply of communal  services,  or even permitting  small scale private vendors or networks in
certain  circumstances.  This is the case of aguateros  in Paraguay.  There are hundreds  of small scale
private  service  providers  of water services,  including  relatively  large  companies  supplying  as many  as
800 connections (Solo and Snell (1998), cited in Ehrhardt (2000)).  Another example are the
telecommunications  micro-entrepreneurs  in Peru, who turn regular cell phones into mobile pay
phones by charging  a mark-up  over the normal tariff, and who are often seen in public gatherings
wearing  brightly  colored  hats or clothes  (Melo  (2000)).  These  activities  should  not be suppressed  by a
regulator  provided  that they  cater to an underserved  market  segment.
Perhaps the most effective  means that a regulator has to benefit lower income users is to promote
competition  in the services  where this is possible. Besides its impact on tariffs, competition  will
increase  the range of available  goods and services,  often generating  services  specifically  tailored  to
the needs of poorer  households.  A clear  example  was  the introduction  of a "calling  party  pays" system
for cellular  telephones  by the telecommunication  regulator in Chile. The introduction  by telephone
companies  of cellular  telephones  based on the use of pre-paid  cards  together  with the above  regulatory
decision has prompted an  accelerated increase in  the access of  poorer households to  cellular
telephony.  These  households  do not have the credit record  to access  more traditional  credit plans and
usually favor pre-payment  methods  which allow them to have a strict budgetary  control over their
expenditure.  Thus, this system is especially  attractive  to poorer households.  In Peru, pre-payment
cellular users account for over 60% of cellular clients (Melo (2000)). The private sector may also
develop other services  which may be attractive  to poorer users, such as special voice messaging
services  which  can  be accessed  from any telephone  (including  a pay phone).
Besides promoting  competition,  a regulator  can also allow and even promote the use of new and
innovative  tariff structures  which may  benefit  low income  users.  Ideally services  should  be offered  as
an optional or menu choice to users. Optional,  or menu tariffs, have the advantage  that users can
decide what is the best choice for themselves  and thus reduces  the informational  requirements  of the
regulator when it comes to deciding the best quality or service standards. Aguas de Illimani in
Bolivia, for example,  offers households  a choice between the regular connection  fee for the water
service or a lower fee provided households  supply their own labor for the connection  activities
(Komives (1999) cited in  Ehrhardt (2000)). In  Peru, companies offer  "popular lines" in  the
telecommunication  sector, which have no initial connection  fee, only a flat monthly  rate has to be
paid, but monthly  traffic is limited (Melo (2000)).  This may be an attractive  service for some poor
(and even  non-poor)  households  with low telephone  usage. By offering  this service  as an option,  users
can self select  the option  which is best suited  for them  and could  be an attractive  way to overcome  the
obstacle  posed  by high connection  charges  for poorer  households.
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5.3.  Social  policy
If there is an overriding  social concemn  regarding  the impact  on the poor of a reform process, then
special counter-measures  can be introduced  through the welfare system. It was argued above that
there is a case for special welfare  programs  in the utility  industries,  although  this does not necessarily
mean  that it should  be administered  by the sectoral  regulator.
Although  the optimal  design of a subsidy  scheme  goes beyond  the limits of this paper, we attempt  to
give some criteria  that may be useful to consider  if special welfare programs are to be created. All
subsidies, including implicit ones, can be classified according to the source of the funding, the
eligibility  criteria  used to identify  beneficiaries,  and the good or service  being  subsidized.
The funding of subsidies  can come from a variety of sources. First, governments  can provide the
funds from general tax revenues.  This is quite typical in the case of urban transport and "negative
concessions"  as those awarded for many toll roads. Second,  they can be raised by charging certain
customers  a price higher than the cost of service. This has been quite standard  for public utilities  in
Latin America  and is likely to continue  to be common  for private utilities when governments  cannot
make credible commitments  to finance subsidies. Third, a fund can be established whereby all
companies must make a contribution  according  to some proportional  rule (e.g. proportional to the
number of customers that each company serves or  proportional to  each company's revenues).
Companies  will still charge a price cost markup  on customers  in order to pay for this contribution.
However,  unlike  the second case, the company  is free to decide which prices and which customer  to
charge.  In Argentina,  a sector specific  levy finances  the expansion  needs in electricity  distribution  and
transmission  in the poorest provinces  but the telecoms  sector is the one in which subsidies are most
commonly funded out of sector specific funds or fees as in various Central American countries.
Which type of funding is  more convenient will depend in part on  the efficiency, equity and
administrative  costs associated with the distortions  created by the general tax system (the cost of
public funds). When the tax financed subsidies  are too costly to enforce and tax reform is not a
realistic  option, it may be more efficient to raise funds from the utility industry, especially  if done
through  the fixed charge part of utility tariffs.  The specific system  selected should, however,  depend
on its sustainability  in a competitive  environment.  Unlike general taxation  which is quite neutral for
the utility industry, cross subsidies  in a competitive  environment  will create incentives for 'cream
skimming' high paying customers  and to ignore low paying customers.  The third alternative  avoids
this last problem  since all companies  will have the same  proportional  responsibility  in the funding  of
the subsidy  scheme-although this may also allow for implicit  and less transparent  subsidies  across
operational  zones.
The eligibility  for a subsidy  can be determined  according  to some categorical  variable, geographical
zones, or directly  testing the income and welfare  levels of each individual  household.  Argentina  has
subsidies  benefited e.g. pensioner or students, and Chisari and Estache (1999) show that while the
intended categories  benefit, many others also do. As mentioned  earlier, in Colombia, a geographic
subsidy has consumers  taxed/subsidized  in their utility bills according to a national socioeconomic
classification  system based on neighborhood  characteristics.  It is a consumption  subsidy funded by
price cost margins  over some consumer,  although  an important  part of the subsidy is also funded by
transfers from central government. V6lez  (1996) has shown that, while intended, in Colombia, the
subsidy  is not well focused on the poor. Rather it is neutral in terms of its impact on income  groups.
In general,  in spite of the fact that they are easier to implement,  categorical  and geographic  subsidies
have major drawbacks.  They will incur higher errors of exclusion (poor customers that should be
eligible are not chosen) and inclusion (relatively wealthier households are erroneously deemed
eligible) than a means tested subsidy. However,  this is an empirical issue that will depend on the
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should be studied  at the design stage of the program.  While subsidies in utility industries  generally
account for a small proportion of household income, means tested subsidies have the undesirable
consequence  of affecting incentives,  especially  with respect to labor market participation.  This is
sometimes  labeled  the 'poverty trap' problem  in the welfare  system.  Geographic  subsidies  also have
secondary  economic  effects that are often  ignored.  Such subsidies,  for example,  may alter the housing
value or rental price of properties  in the benefited  areas,  thus reducing the purported  benefits  of the
scheme  for those living  in those areas. 28
Finally,  once the specific  type of subsidy  has been decided,  its object has to be picked as well and a
criteria must be followed  to avoid mistakes.  Subsidies  can be classified according to the good or
service  which  is the object of the subsidy.  In utility industries,  this can either be the consumption  of a
utility  service  or the connection  costs to the network.  Ideally,  the subsidy  scheme should be directed
to those goods with the highest difference  between  willingness  to pay and costs. There is a strong
presumption  that in Latin America  at least this would indicate  that connections  or network  expansion
subsidies  should  be favored  over consumption  subsidies.  This is  because the capital market failures
have a stronger  impact  on connections.  Indeed,  while the willingness  to pay for a connection  is quite
high-it  is almost  impossible  to borrow  to pay for this connection..29
Maybe the most effective  schemes  developed  so far-i.e.  the ones internalizing  the lessons discussed
so far-have  been proposed  by Chile. One is the individual  targeted  subsidy  scheme as implemented
by Chile in the water sector. In this case, households  applying for the program are interviewed
individually  by a social assistant.  Based on household  economic  status, measured  indirectly  by the
physical characteristics  of the dwelling and the ownership  of durable goods, a social economic
ranking  is given  to each applying  households.  Those  that are eligible  for the subsidy  (the 20%  poorest
households)  are then given a three year subsidy  that covers a maximum  of 85% of the water  bill for
the first 20 cubic meters of consumption.  Although the Chilean individual subsidy scheme will
probably  be better targeted  than the Colombian  cross-subsidy  scheme,  recent research  results show
that  a  substantial amount of  the subsidy is  leaked to  higher income groups. In addition, the
administrative  costs of implementing  such a scheme are high and may compensate  for the extra
targeting  benefits.
In recent  years, innovative  schemes  have been  implemented  in Chile to subsidize  the expansion  of the
network in rural areas, both in electricity,  water and telecommunications.  In this case projects are
chosen and evaluated  by the government.  A concession  contract  is then tendered  to the private sector.
The winning  firm is the one that requires  the lowest amount  of public subsidies  in order to undertake
the project.  The novelty  of this approach  is that the required amount of subsidies is determined  by
market competition  and experience  shows that this amount  is lower than what the government  had
originally estimated. Since the introduction  of these schemes, the rural electricity program has
benefited 113,090  households,  raising  rural electricity  coverage  from 57% in 1994 to 75% in 1999,
for a cost of about  US$24 per year  (Serra (2000)).  In telecommunications,  since the program  began in
1995,  close to 6,000 public  phones  have been installed  in rural localities.  By the year 2001,  over 80%
of the rural population  will have access  to a public phone up from 10% in 1995. The cost of this
program has been modest, below US$20 million since its inception (Serra (2000)). The use of
competitive  bidding  for the use of public subsidies  has allowed  the authorities  to make the most of
limited  resources.
28  Unless of course they are the original owners of the property in which case they make a windfall gain in property values.
29  In fact the net present value of the benefits from-and  the willingness to pay for-a  connection are for many poor and
for  society is, in many cases, likely  to be higher than the amount of  the loan  which would be  needed  to finance  the
connection. An efficient capital market would be willing to provide this loan.28  Utility Privatization and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enoueh to Get It rieht?
There are many other considerations and complications for the design of subsidy schemes in utility
industries. For example, it will often be the case in poor urban areas that households share a common
dwelling. How should eligibility be determined in such a case if utility services are shared? According
to the poorest household of the group or the median household?  Are decisions made by regulators
responsible for tariff setting coordinated with the decisions on social and welfare institutions in charge
of subsidies? Budgetary planning must take into account the impacts that expected tariff changes will
have  on  the financial requirements  of subsidy schemes.  These and  other  issues  require careful
consideration.  The optimal  design  of  a  subsidy  scheme is  a  complex  task  that requires  careful
numerical analysis. 30 The main point to record at this stage is that there are no recipes in this area. It
may  well be  that  a  cross-subsidy  may be  overall better  suited to  a  particular situation  than  an
individual targeted scheme.  Table 6 summarizes questions and concems to address when deciding on
a subsidy.
Table 6 Criteria to select subsidies
~~~~  _I
General tax revenues  cost of public funds (reflecting tax collection
difficulties, improper design) may be too high in
comparison to the benefits of the expenditure
programs
Users faced with positive price cost  While it may be easier to monitor inefficiencies
margins  and unfairness that may arise, sustainability of
this explicit or implicit cross-subsidy in
competitive environment may be dubious as
cream skimming can erode the potential revenue
base needed to fund the poorest
Utility company revenues (e.g. flat  Sustainability in competitive environment may
percentage of revenue levied on all  be less dubious and quite easy to implement but
operators)  not always fair or efficient since it involves
implicit cross-subsidies
Whi  1 Categorical  Easiest to achieve some desirable targeting
e  l  g4,E  ftproperties  but may result in some perverse
criteajato  ~~~~~~~~incentive  to try to join specific customer
l4~p?  |  mcategories  to be eligible
Geographic  May combine poor and rich, high costs and low
costs and hence may be inefficient and may not
generate the right incentive since they may
influence housing values for instance, .but may
be the cheapest to implement
.Means  tested  Most efficient and fair way of allocating
subsidies but requires largest amounts of
information and is hence costly to implement; in
addition, may reduce incentive to look for  a job
What to  Consumption  Focus on good or service for which there is the
Connection  greatest shortfall between willingness to pay and
cost of the service
30  See Foster, V., A. G6mez-Lobo and J. Halpern (1999) for a case study of the design of  a water subsidy scheme in
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6.  CONCLUSIONS
The main  conclusions  of this paper  are that:
*  utility reform processes can affect poor household in varied and often complex ways and
while  a typology  of issues would  be useful, it is quite challenging  to develop  without  a more
detailed  analysis  of experiences  so far;
*  it is by no means  certain  that vulnerable  households  will  be hurt by reform  processes.  There  is
much myth in the discussions  surrounding  this issue and there are many examples where
poorer  households  have actually  benefited  from  reforms;
*  it is quite amazing  to see the extent to which governments  and their advisors-including
sometimes  multilaterals-fail to measure,  anticipate  and monitor the effects of privatization
on the poor;
*  the good news  is that there are many  measures  that can be taken to improve  the chances  that
poorer households benefit from  reforms. Foremost among these is  the promotion of
competition  where  this is possible;  and
*  finally,  although  there are no recipes,  there are many suggestions  that can be made  regarding
privatization  policy, regulatory policy and social policy that will increase the benefits
accruing to poor households  after reform  during the transition to the implementation  of an
effective general welfare policy...but there are many more questions that still need to be
addressed  before  good general  guidelines  can  be drawn.
The upshot  of this discussion  is that what is really needed  is political  commitment.  If previous  policy
on expenditure  incidence  was poor pre-privatization,  unless something  is done about them as part of
the reforms,  it will be weak  post-privatization  as well.  Privatization  is not a substitute  for responsible,
redistributive  welfare  policies. Welfare  discussions  are complex,  especially  inter-household  welfare
discussions.  Moreover,  welfare  options open up the possible,  but not much more.  Policies  leading  to
potential  welfare  gains abound  in economics.  Policies  leading  to real welfare gains are a much rarer
commodity.  Whether  a policy  achieves  a real gain consistent  with its potential  depends  on its design,
its implementation  ... and in particular  the commitment  to implement  it!
7.  REFERENCES
Ahmad, E. and N.Stem (1991). The theory and practice of tax reform in developing countries
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press).
Ajwad  and Wodon  (2000).  "Bolivia  Poverty  Assessment",  mimeo,  The World  Bank,  LACPREM.
Benitez,  D, 0. Chisari  and A. Estache  (2000).  "Measuring  the fiscal-efficiency-distribution  trade-offs
in Argentina's  utilities  privatization",  mimeo,  The World  Bank,  WBIGF.
Boland, John and Dale Whittington (2000). "The Political Economy of Water Tariff Design in
Developing  Countries:  Increasing  Block Tariffs versus  Uniform Price with Rebate", The Political
Economy  of Water  Pricing  Reforms,  Edited  by Ariel  Dinar  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press).
Boadway  and Wildasin  (1984).  Public  Sector  Economics,  2nd Edition (Little  Brown).30  Utility Privatization  and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enough to Get It rieht?
Canning, D., M. Fay, R. Perotti (1992). "Infrastructure and growth", Rivista di Politica economica,
82:113-47, November.
Chisari,  O.,  A.  Estache  and  C.  Romero  (1999).  "Winners  and  Losers  from  Privatization  and
Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina", The World Bank
Economic Review, Vol. 13, N. 2, 357-78.
Chisari and Estache (1999). "Universal Service Obligations in Argentina", niimeo, the World Bank,
WBIGF.
Cremer, H, F. Gasmi and J.J. Laffont (1998). "Universal Service Definition, Cost and Financing: The
EEC experience", mimeo, IDEI, Toulouse.
Ehrhardt, D. (2000). "Using Market Structure Reforms to Improve Options for the Poor", mimeo, The
World Bank, PSD Group.
Esrey,  S.  (1996).  "Water,  waste  and  well-being:  A  multi-country  study",  American  Journal  of
Epidemiology, vol 43, No6, pp.608-623.
Estache,  Foster,  Wodon  and  Wellenstein  (1999).  "Infrastructure and  Poverty  in  Latin  America",
Research proposal, LACSFP.
Estache, A. and M. Rodriguez-Pardina (2000). "Light and Lightning at the End of the Public Tunnel",
Manzetti,  L.,  ed., Regulatory  Policy  in Latin America:  Post-Privatization  Realities  (North-South
Center Press, University of Miami) pp. 171-189.
FIEL (2000). "Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities", World Bank, WBIGF, mimeo.
Foster, V. (1999), "Literature Review for Regional Studies Project on Privatization and Infrastructure
Services of the Urban Poor", mimeo, the World Bank, LACSFP
Foster, V., A. G6mez-Lobo, and J. Halpern (1999). "Designing Water Subsidies in Panama", mimeo,
The World Bank,  LACSFP.
Foster, V. (2000). "Measuring the Impact of reform and private participation in infrastructure on the
poor",  presentation  at  a  World  Bank  workshop on  poverty  and  infrastructure  privatization,  PSD
Group.
Gain,  H.A.  (1993).  "Pricing  and  Demand  Management:  A  Theme  Paper  on  Managing  Water
Resources To Meet Megacity Needs", The World Bank: TWUWS, August.
G6mez-Lobo, A. (1996). "The Welfare Consequences of Tariff Rebalancing in the Domestic Gas
Market", Fiscal Studies, Vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 49-65.
G6mez-Lobo, A., V. Foster and J.  Halpem  (1999). "Informational  and  Modeling Issues Related to
Water Subsidy Design", mimeo, World Bank, LACFSP.
Guasch, J.L. (2000).  "The Impact on Performance and Renegotiation of Concession Design: Lessons
from an Empirical Analysis of Ten Years of Concession Experience", mnimeo,  World Bank, LACSFP.Infrastructure for Development: Private Solutions and the Poor  31
Hancock, R.  and C. Waddams-Price (1997). "The Competitive Market for Residential Consumers,
Evidence  from the  South West  of England",  research paper 97/1,  Centre for  Management  under
Regulation, University of Warwick, March.
Komives, K., D. Whittington and X. Wu (2000). "Infrastructure Coverage and the Poor: A Global
Perspective", mimeo, The World Bank, PSD Group.
Kraai,  A.  and  D.  Dollar  (2000).  "Growth  is  Good  for  the  Poor",  mimeo,  The  World  Bank,
Development Research Group.
Leipziger, D. (2000). "Achieving Social and Political Consensus", Development Outreach, Volume 2,
Number 1, pp. 18-23.
Melo, J.R. (2000). "Telecoms reform and the poor", mimeo, The World Bank, PSD Group.
Navajas (2000). "El Impacto Distributivo de low Cambios en los Precios Relativos en la Argentina
Entre 1988-1998 y los Efectos de las Privatizaciones y la Desregulacion Economica", in Fundacion de
Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas, La Distribucion del Ingreso en la Argentina.
NRECA (1999). "Rehabilitation  of Rural Electric Infrastructure in  Hurricane-Affected Areas:  An
Unsolicited Proposal for the Dominican Republic", mimeo, Arlington, Virginia.
Sandmo, A.(1998). "Redistribution and the marginal cost of public funds", Journal of Public
Economics (Netherlands); 70:365-82 December.
Serra, P. (2000). "Subsidies in Chilean Public Utilities", World Bank, WBIGF, mimeo.
Tynan, N. (2000). "Private Participation in Infrastructure and the Poor: Water and Sanitation", draft,
The World Bank, PSD Group.
V6lez, C.E. (1996). Gasto Social y  Desigualdad, Logros y  Desafios: Estudio de la incidencia del
gasto publico social en Colombia, Departamento de Planeaci6n Nacional, Republica de Colombia.
Vickers, J. (1998). "Regulation, competition and the structure of prices", in Competition in Regulated
Industries, edited by Dieter Helm and Tim Jenkinson, Oxford University Press.
Waddams-Price (2000). "Rethinking  Subsidies for  Infrastructure", mimeo,  the  World Bank,  PSD
Group and University of Warwick.
Walker, I.  F.  Ordonez, P.  Serrano and  J.  Halpern  (2000). "Potable  Water  Pricing  and the  Poor:
Evidence from Central America on the Distribution of Subsidies and on  the Demand for Improved
Services", mimeo, The World Bank, LACFSP.
Wodon, Q., R. Ayres, M. Barenstein, N. Hicks, K. Lee, W. Maloney, P.Peeters, C. Siaens, and S.
Yitzhaki  (2000). Poverty  and  Policy  in  Latin America  and  the  Caribbean,  The  World  Bank,
Washington, DC, forthcoming
Wodon,  Q.,  Ajwad,  I.  And  C.  Siaens  (2000),  "Should  Utilities  Subsidize  Connections  of
Consumption? The Impact of Distributional Weights", mimeo
World Bank (1995). "Reforming Provincial Utilities", mimeo.32  Utility Privatization and the Needs of the Poor in Latin America: Have We Learned Enoueh to Get It right?
Contreras,  D. and A. Gomez-Lobo  (2000), "Privatization  of telecommunications  and electricity  in
Chile:  How did the poor fare?,  mimeo,  Department  of Economics,  University  of Chile.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2391  Are the Poor Protected from Budget  Martin Ravallion  July 2000  P. Sader
Cuts? Theory and Evidence for  33902
Argentina
WPS2392  What Factors Appear to Drive Private  Dipak Dasgupta  July 2000  S. Crow
Capital Flows  to Developing Countries? Dilip Ratha  30763
And How Does Official Lending
Respond?
WPS2393  Will the Euro Trigger More Monetary  Patrick Honohan  July 2000  A. Yaptenco
Unions in Africa?  Philip R. Lane  31823
WPS2394  Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the  Waly Wane  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Remuneration of Heterogeneous  37658
Inspectors
WPS2395  Decentralizing the Provision of Health  William Jack  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Services: An Incomplete Contracts  37698
Approach
WPS2396  Aid Dependence and the Quality of  Stephen Knack  July 2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Governance: A Cross-Country  38526
Empirical Analysis
WPS2397  Verifying Exchange Rate Regimes  Jeffrey Frankel  July 2000  E. Khine
Eduardo Fajnzylber  37471
Sergio Schmukler
Luis Serv6n
WPS2398  Determinants of Current Account  Cesar Calder6n  July 2000  H. Vargas
Deficits in Developing Countries  Alberto Chong  38546
Norman Loayza
WPS2399  Managers, Investors, and Crises:  Graciela Kaminsky  July 2000  E. Khine
Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging  Richard Lyons  37471
Markets  Sergio Schmukler
WPS2400  Child Care and Women's Labor Force  Monica Fong  July 2000  P. Sader
Participation in Romania  Michael Lokshin  33902
WPS2401  Telecom Traffic and Investment in  Scott J. Wallsten  July 2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Developing Countries: The Effects  38526
Of International Settlement Rate
Reductions
WPS2402  Debt Management in Brazil:  Afonso S. Bevilaqua  July 2000  S. Bery
Evaluation of the Real Plan and  Marcio G. P. Garcia  85178
Challenges AheadPolicy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2403  Can  the World  Cut Poverty  in Half?  Paul  Collier  July 2000  E. Khine
How  Policy  Reform  and Effective  David  Dollar  37471
Aid Can  Meet  International
Development  Goals
WPS2404  The Distribution  of Mexico's  Public  Gladys Lopez-Acevedo  July 2000  M. Geller
Spending  on Education  Angel  Salinas  85155
WPS2405  Marginal  Willingness  to Pay  for  Gladys Lopez-Acevedo  July 2000  M. Geller
Education  and  the Determinants  of  Angel  Salinas  85155
Enrollment  in Mexico
WPS2406  How  Mexico's  Financial  Crisis  Gladys Lopez-Acevedo  July 2000  M. Geller
Affected  Income  Distribution  Angel  Salinas  85155